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By
Henry Ordower1
The State Tax Dilemma. States, often hamstrung by state constitutional balanced budget
requirements preventing deficit spending, must reduce services (or increase taxes) if revenue is
insufficient to fund them.2 To maintain revenue and services, states have sought, sometimes
aggressively, additional sources of tax revenue. As earnings of athletes and entertainers
increased, for example, states began to assert claims to tax a portion of their earnings from
playing or performing occasionally, but not regularly, in the state.3 Similarly, use tax payment
lines began to appear on state income tax returns.4 In response to the increasing volume of sales
by remote vendors to state residents, taxing authorities sought to require out-of-state vendors to
collect use taxes on goods shipped into the state.5 This strategy was bolstered significantly by the
recent Supreme Court decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair.6 Unlike Amazon laws imposing use
tax collection obligations on out-of-state vendors that have a physical presence in the taxing
state, Wayfair enables states to require out-of-state vendors without a physical presence in the
taxing state to collect use tax on the taxing state’s behalf.7 Some states have been slow to
implement legislation to utilize the authority that Wayfair provides, but it is likely that all states
with a sales and complementary use tax ultimately will enact the necessary legislation to assure
collection of use tax revenue.8
During the ongoing pandemic, commuter destination states like Massachusetts (Boston) and New
York (New York City), threatened with loss of income tax revenue because neighboring state
residents stopped physically working in the commuter destination state, assert continuing taxing
1

Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, A.B. Washington University; M.A., J.D. The University
of Chicago. The author is grateful to Vince Jones, J.D. candidate, and David Kullman, law librarian, for research
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For example, MO. CONST. art. III, § 37; MO. CONST. art. IV, § 24. See, generally, Jared Walczak, State Strategies
for Closing FY 2020 with a Balanced Budget, Tax Foundation (4/2/20), available at https://taxfoundation.org/fy2020-state-budgets-fy-2021-state-budgets/; GAO, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
House of Representatives Balanced Budget Requirements State Experiences and Implications for the Federal
Government (1993), available at https://www.gao.gov/products/AFMD-93-58BR.
3
See, for example, N.Y. tax Law § 631 (McKinney 2019); Mo. Rev. Stat. §143.183 (2018); Jerome R. Hellerstein &
Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation P 20.05(4)(d), at 18 (3d ed. 2003).
4
For example, line 91 of California Form 505. Inclusion of use tax lines has enjoyed limited success in the absence
of third-party collection of use taxes or reporting of sales into the state to resident purchasers.
5
INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, https://ilsr.org/rule/internet-sales-tax-fairness/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2021)
(“In 2008, New York pioneered a policy strategy that effectively skirted the constraints of Quill and forced Amazon,
Overstock, and other web-only retailers to collect the state’s sales tax.”).
6
S. Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2080 (2018).
7
Wayfair overruled previous Supreme Court precedent in Quill which required a physical presence but invited
Congress to change the physical presence requirement. Congress failed to act and the Supreme Court then reserved
itself. For additional discussion, Henry Ordower, Avoiding Federal and State Constitutional Limitations in Taxation,
168 TAX NOTES FED. 1447, 1447 (2020).
8
Hannah Meehan, Comment, Leveling the Playing Field for Remote Sellers: Missouri’s Response in a Post-Wayfair
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Henry Ordower, Decoupling State Income Tax

Page 1

jurisdiction over the wages resident employers pay the employees working remotely from their
states of residence. New Hampshire has sued under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to resolve the interstate dispute.9 The assertion of continuing taxing jurisdiction risks
saddling employees who stopped commuting, possibly only temporarily, with income tax
obligations in both the state of residence and the state of their previous commute. Residence
states, like New Jersey and Connecticut, ceded primary taxing jurisdiction to the commuting
destination state through a credit against their state income tax for tax payable to the state in
which the employee was working.10 These states may deny the tax credit because, absent
physical presence of the employee in destination state, that state arguably no longer has
jurisdiction to collect the income tax. This quest for enhanced state income tax revenue may
mark the beginning of increased competition among states for individual incomes taxes.
Historically, states with income taxes11 tied most of their income tax computations to federal
income tax computations although each state makes adjustments that distinguish the computation
of state taxable income from the federal taxable income. The decision to follow federal
computations was sensible and simple. That decision facilitated state reporting and enabled
states to rely primarily on federal auditing and limited the amount of infrastructure each state
needed to enforce tax compliance. Decoupling from the federal income tax is not a new concept
at all but most decoupling was relatively low cost to the states. An example is the capital gain
preference. Except for a short period following recodification of the Internal Revenue Code in
1986, net capital gains of individuals and trusts have enjoyed a rate preference under the federal
income tax12 but not under most state income taxes. In recent years that separation required no
distinct computational mechanism as it was simply the imposition of a rate to net income.
Earlier, when the preference at federal level was a deduction, the state had to adjust federal
adjusted gross income to tax capital gain fully. States have decoupled from federal income tax
computations in other ways as well, recently from the qualified business income deduction
enacted in 2017.13 Colorado, Idaho and North Dakota follow the federal income tax deduction
for qualified business income; other states using federal adjusted gross income as their
computational point of departure do not follow federal.
Consistent reliance on federal tax computations does not prevent multiple state tax impositions
but does avoid some complexities from differing computations. For businesses that must
apportion their revenue among states in which they operate, inconsistent state apportionment
9

New Hampshire v Massachusetts, Sup. Ct. Dkt 22O154 (10/23/20),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o154.html (challenging
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, the extra-territorial reach of the Massachusetts’ income tax into
New Hampshire on New Hampshire commuting employees’ wages when they are working remotely without
entering Massachusetts. New Hampshire’s does not tax income from services. New Jersey does tax wage income
and joined other states in filing an amicus brief supporting New Hampshire’s claim).
10
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:4-1 (West 2020).
11
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming have no income tax. New Hampshire
and Tennessee do not tax income from the performance of services, including wages.
12
I.R.C. § 1(h). Before 1987, the rate preference was indirect through a 50 or 60% net capital gain deduction or
partial exclusion. Net capital gain under I.R.C. § 1222(11) is the excess of net long term capital gain over net short
term capital loss.
13
I.R.C. § 199A, added by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in 2017 (most states begin their state income tax
computation from federal adjusted gross income and the qualified business income deduction is not an adjustment to
federal gross income, so it is not part of that computation).
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formulas yield confusion and duplicative taxation.14 As states decouple from federal income tax
rules and assert broader taxing jurisdiction than before, complexity and discontinuities may grow
and result in multiple tax impositions.
This commentary reflects on the structure of state income taxes and credits for taxes paid by
residents to other states and the confusion non-uniform decoupling generates across state
borders. Separation from federal rules may help to staunch the loss of state revenue from federal
tax amendments15 and enhance state tax revenue, especially revenue that the state otherwise
might never capture but to which it may have a claim.
This short article focuses on proposed legislation in New York state (“NY”) that would tax the
unrealized gain and other deferred income of NY’s billionaires16 and the complexities that
legislation’s enactment is likely to generate. The article will consider responses from other
jurisdictions to ameliorate the discontinuity that the NY legislation will cause as states seek to
enhance their income tax revenue and capture a larger share of the income tax base without
running afoul of constitutional limitations on states’ taxing power, especially equal protection17
and the right to travel.18
Unrealized appreciation and other deferred income. Among features of the federal income
tax most favorable to wealthy taxpayers is the realization requirement. Gain and loss are not
realized until the taxpayer chooses to sell property.19 Inclusion of gain and loss in gross income,
referred to as recognition, generally follows realization unless another tax provision defers the
recognition.20 With very limited exceptions,21 if a taxpayer does not choose to sell property, the
taxpayer’s economic gain remains free from the income tax. In a variety of ways, a taxpayer may
dispose of property without recognizing the economic gain embedded in the property. The
taxpayer may give the property to others,22 even claiming a charitable contribution deduction

14
R. Bruce Johnson, The Multistate Tax Commission - Its History and Its Future, 6 THE ST. AND LOC. TAX LAW. 45,
50-51 (2001); Andrea Muse, States Trending Toward Single Sales Factor, Panelist Says, TAX NOTES (Jan. 27,
2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/apportionment/states-trending-toward-single-sales-factorpanelist-says/.
15
When the federal rules for depreciation deductions accelerate depreciation recovery, for example, the intended
reduction of the federal income tax is accompanied by reductions in state income taxes.
16
The “billionaire mark to market tax and the worker bailout fund tax” (the “MtM Tax”), S08277, 2019-2020
General Assembly, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/S8277 (visited 1/18/21).
17
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 564 (1997) (property tax exemption
discriminating against out of state residents is impermissible under Equal Protection).
18
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (recognizing fundamental right to travel). Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 564 (1997) (property tax exemption discriminating against out of state residents
is impermissible under Equal Protection).
19
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (gain is realized from the sale or other disposition of property if the amount realized under I.R.C.
§ 1001(b) on sale exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property under I.R.C. § 1011).
20
I.R.C. § 1001(c). Installment sales (I.R.C. § 453) defer inclusion in income of realized and recognized gain and
are not an exception to recognition governed by I.R.C. § 1001.
21
Exceptions include mark to market inclusion for commodities and other financial positions (I.R.C. § 1256), mark
to market inclusion for dealer securities (I.R.C. § 475), and the expatriation tax (I.R.C. § 877A).
22
I.R.C. § 1001(c) (requiring a sale or exchange for recognition) and I.R.C. § 102 (no inclusion of value of gift in
recipient’s income); I.R.C. § 1015 (donee takes donor’s basis if the donor is living thereby preserving the donor’s
economic gain for inclusion if the donee sells the property).
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equal to the value of the property while giving it away,23 and exchange the property for different
property.24 The taxpayer also may monetize the appreciation in value by borrowing against the
security of the property without disposing of it.25 If the appreciated property passes from the
taxpayer to another at death, the embedded economic gain permanently escapes income taxation
because the decedent’s estate receives a new basis in the property, equal to its fair market value
on the decedent’s date of death, against which to measure gain or loss.26
Combining the realization requirement and the new basis at death elements of the federal income
tax enables affluent taxpayers who hold much of their wealth in appreciated property to escape
both federal and state income tax on their economic gains. States have no federal constitutional
or federal statutory obligation to follow federal taxation rules or principles, but it is customary
for them to do so. Even if realization were a U.S. constitutional requirement under the 16th
Amendment definition of income, as it originally may have been interpreted to be,27 states have
been free to adopt their own income definitions and reject both the realization requirement and
the new basis at death rule. Nevertheless, states have uniformly, and understandably, followed
federal taxation on these matters. Perhaps the stress on state treasuries from the pandemic28
marks the moment for states to capture additional revenue by decoupling further than they do
from federal tax rules.
While the realization requirement affords all property owners the opportunity to enjoy increase
in property value without current taxation, the loss of potential tax revenue from failure to tax
economic appreciation is troubling. Commentators29 and politicians30 have argued that both the
23

I.R.C. § 170 (charitable contribution deduction).
I.R.C. § 1031 (nonrecognition of realized gain if the taxpayer exchanges real property for like-kind property);
I.R.C. § 1034 (nonrecognition of realized gain if the taxpayer reinvests the proceeds from an involuntary disposition
of property in property related in service or use); I.R.C. § 351 (nonrecognition of gain on exchange of property for
corporate stock); I.R.C. § 721 (likewise for a partnership or limited liability company interest).
25
Borrowing money does not yield includable income because the taxpayer has an obligation to repay the borrowed
funds even if the taxpayer is not personally obligated to repay because the borrowing is without recourse. Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 US. 1, 1 (1947).
26
I.R.C. §1014(a) (property received from a decedent’s estate has an adjusted basis equal to the fair market value of
the property at the decedent’s date of death without regard to the decedent’s adjusted basis in the property while
alive). The new basis at death rule does not apply to property that would yield income with respect to a decedent
under I.R.C. § 691 including retirement accounts, other than Roth IRAs, and installment sale contracts. I.R.C. §
1014(c). The new basis at death rule was changed twice to a rule requiring recipients of property from a decedent to
continue the decedent’s pre-death basis. The first change in 1976 enacting I.R.C. § 1023 (repealed 1977) while the
second change applied only to decedent’s dying in 2010, a year in which there was no estate tax. Repeal of this rule
may become part of President Biden’s proposals to increase taxes on wealthy taxpayers. Paul Sullivan, WEALTH
MATTERS: The Estate Tax May Change Under Biden, Affecting Far More People, THE NEW YORK TIMES (1/15/21),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/your-money/estate-tax-biden.html (visited 1/18/21).
27
Eisner v. Macomber 252 U.S. 189, 211-12 (1920).
28
Covid-19 coronavirus began to spread in early 2020. A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 179 (Miquel Porta et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2008); WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19,
https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-mediabriefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 (last visited 1/25/2021).
29
This commentator, for example, Henry Ordower, Capital, an Elusive Tax Object and Impediment to Sustainable
Taxation, 23 FLA. TAX REV. 625, 625 (2020) and Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward a
Comprehensive Tax Base, 67 BUFFALO L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2019).
30
See U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN., WYDEN UNVEILS PROPOSAL TO FIX BROKEN TAX CODE, EQUALIZE
TREATMENT OF WAGES AND WEALTH, PROTECT SOCIAL SECURITY (2019).
24
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realization requirement and the new basis at death rule31 have become obsolete. Without
providing relief for some taxpayers, changing the rule may prove politically problematic where it
might compel homeowners to sell or encumber their homes to raise the funds needed to pay the
tax on appreciation in value.32 Where great wealth is involved, however, eliminating this
opportunity to avoid taxation of gain is appealing and a potential source of much needed tax
revenue.
The NY Mark to Market Tax. Against this background and consistent with calls to increase
taxes on the wealthy, the proposed legislation in NY would tax billionaires currently on much of
their deferred income and the unrealized appreciation in their assets. If enacted,33 the MtM Tax
requires resident billionaires to realize and recognize gain for NY income tax purposes as if they
sold all their assets, including pension savings plans, at their fair market values on July 1, 2020.
Special valuation rules seek to eliminate any value-discounting the taxpayer has undertaken. For
purposes of determining whether a taxpayer is a billionaire, the net fair market value of assets
owned by them is enhanced under rules akin to constructive ownership rules34 by the assets of
related persons, including spouse, minor children, certain private foundations to which the
billionaire has contributed, and assets the billionaire transferred to third parties by gift within the
previous five years. Billionaire residents in NY for less than a five-year period as of July 1, 2020
may increase the adjusted bases of their assets for purposes of the MtM Tax to fair market value
on the date they became a resident. That basis increase, as opposed to the basis increase
following inclusion of mark to market gain in income, must not apply to basis for purposes of an
actual sale. If it did, it would offer less than five year residents of NY a planning opportunity to
escape state tax on much of their unrealized gain. Taxpayers subject to the MtM Tax may spread
the additional tax liability over ten years but must pay a 7.5 percent per annum charge on the
deferred amounts. After 2020, the MtM Tax becomes an annual mark to market inclusion
requirement for resident billionaires.
Enactment of the MtM Tax and its effective date, if enacted, are uncertain.35 The currently
pending legislation would apply to billionaires who were resident in the state of NY on July 1,
2020, a date now past. As the legislation was not introduced until May 1, 2020, a non-domiciled
billionaire with a permanent abode in the state had only a short window during which to avoid
the 183-day residence definition36 and avoid imposition of the tax. Had NY offered more time
between the proposed effective date and the introduction of the legislation, NY resident
billionaires might have established residence in another state to avoid the tax and the tax would
31

Ha rry L. Gutma n , Taxing Gains at Death, 170 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 269 (J AN. 11, 2021).

32

This concern has been raised repeatedly with respect to ad valorem real property taxes and contributed to
successful voter tax limitation initiatives, including Proposition 13 in California.
33
Whether NY’s proposal is a serious contender for passage is doubtful. See, for example,
Luis Ferré-Sadurní and Jesse McKinley, Cuomo Offers Doomsday Proposal to Attack a Possible $15 Billion Deficit,
NEW YORK TIMES (Jan.19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/nyregion/budget-cuomony.html?searchResultPosition=1.
34
I.R.C. § 318.
35
Anna Gronewold, Cuomo warns of tax hikes, dire cuts if feds can’t find $15B, POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2021, 7:24 PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2021/01/19/cuomo-warns-of-tax-hikes-dire-cuts-if-fedscant-find-15b-1358381.
36
N.Y. tax Law § 605(b)(1) (B) (McKinney 2018). (Section 605(b)(1)(A) includes another test for taxpayers
domiciled in NY without a permanent abode.).
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not produce revenue as planned. Even if the proposal fails, it may be a harbinger of future mark
to market tax legislation in states needing to increase tax revenue.
Exit and Continuation Taxes. Rather than taxing billionaires immediately on all economic
gain, a state might tax gain accrued during residence when the taxpayer ceases to be a state
resident. NY could have used such a tax to backstop a longer interim between introduction and
effective date. While the U.S. and other countries, including Canada, impose a tax on
expatriating individuals that requires them to include deferred income and mark their assets to
market and include gain as if they sold their assets on the date of expatriation,37 a state seeking
similarly to tax those who cease to be residents might run afoul of the constitutional right to
travel. Such a tax advances the legitimate state interest of protecting its tax base by preventing
appreciation and deferred compensation that accrued during a taxpayer’s resident period from
permanently escaping the state’s income tax. Insofar as the state could have taxed the income
when earned or accrued, but permitted the tax benefit of deferral, the state has a rational basis for
taxing the income when it is about to lose taxing jurisdiction over the taxpayer.38 Moreover, the
federal prohibition on the alternate scheme of a continuation tax on retirement fund distributions,
discussed in the next paragraph, limits the ability of the state to capture that tax revenue in
another manner. Nevertheless, immediate and burdensome taxation of deferred income and
unrealized appreciation is likely to chill taxpayers from changing their state of residence and
perhaps excessively burden their fundamental right to travel.39
Paralleling an expatriation tax is a continuation tax.40 A continuation tax does not impose any
immediate burden when the taxpayer changes their state of residence. Instead, the taxpayer’s
previous residence state taxes the portion of deferred income and includable gain that accrued
while the taxpayer was resident when the taxable event, receipt of payment or sale of property,
occurs. Several state courts have held such a tax to be constitutional and permissible but federal
legislation now prohibits states from asserting continued taxing jurisdiction over certain
retirement income of previous residents.41 Given the federal prohibition and uncertainty
concerning the constitutionality of an exit tax, decoupling from the federal computation of
income, including abandonment of the realization requirement and other federal income deferral
rules becomes an attractive structural change to bolster state tax collection and protect the state
tax base from future revenue loss accompanying changes of residence.42
37

I.R.C. § 877A.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 1 (1992) (applying a rational basis standard of review to the California property
tax assessment scheme of Proposition 13 despite its likely increased tax burden on taxpayers moving to California).
39
Id. at 10-11 (Right to travel was not before the Court in Nordlinger and the Court did not address this issue on the
merits. It is an argument that could be brought in the future.). In the EU, a French expatriation tax was held to
violate the Treaty of Rome because it burdens free movement. Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v
Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2452.
40
Compare I.R.C. § 877 (taxing an expatriate on income following expatriation).
41
4 U.S.C. § 114 (2017); Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation P 20.07, at 9 (3d ed. 2003) (In
1996, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting a state from imposing “an income tax on any retirement income of an
individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such State (as determined under the laws of such state).”).
42
NY currently has many taxpayers who retire to low state income tax jurisdictions such as Florida and Texas
collecting their deferred pension compensation from NY employment free from NY state tax. Alexandre Tanzi and
Wei Lu, Even Before Covid 2,600 People a Week Were Leaving New York City, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5th, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-05/even-before-covid-2-600-people-a-week-were-leaving-newyork-city; Jack Kelly, New Yorkers Are Leaving The City In Droves: Here’s Why They’re Moving And Where
38
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The MtM Tax and other states. With its effective date of July 1, 2020, the proposed MtM Tax
stands to generate significant revenue quickly for the state of NY from resident billionaires who
missed the opportunity to change their residence to a state not considering a similar tax.43
Operation of the MtM Tax raises issues with respect to harmonization of tax rules among states
and poses a serious risk of double or multiple impositions of income tax on the same income and
gain. There is also a question as to whether the tax might be a wealth tax imposed ad valorem on
property. If it is and burdens intangible personal property, the NY state constitution prohibits the
tax.44 Further questions arise whether the tax unreasonably discriminates against a class of
taxpayers, but the class of billionaires hardly seems worthy of constitutionally enhanced scrutiny
and protection.
Tax basis discontinuity under the MtM Tax. A few examples suffice to illustrate the complex
range of basis and double tax issues enactment of the MtM Tax will generate.
Example 1. Taxpayer (“T”), a billionaire resident in NY for more than five years, owns
appreciated real property in New Jersey (“NJ”). The MtM Tax includes the unrealized
appreciation in the property in the taxpayer’s NY income tax. Two years later, the taxpayer sells
the property. NJ follows federal computations and taxes the gain based on the taxpayer’s
adjusted basis, not as increased following imposition of the MtM Tax but following federal
adjusted basis. Since the gain would not be taxable in NY, insofar as T has an increased basis in
NY, the gain would not generate a tax credit in NY for the New Jersey tax. New Jersey would
not credit the earlier MtM Tax since the tax credit structure always has the general taxing
jurisdiction ceding tax to the non-resident jurisdiction not vice versa as is the case here.
Example 2. T as in example 1, following imposition of the MtM Tax, moves to NJ. After
establishing NJ residence, T sells some corporate shares that were subject to the MtM Tax in
NY. T is taxable in New Jersey on the gain following federal adjusted basis. T no longer is
taxable in NY, so there is no tax in NY against which to credit the New Jersey tax and New
Jersey would not need to credit the earlier MtM Tax and NY would not refund the earlier MtM
Tax when T is correctly taxed in New Jersey. Since the MtM Tax increases the basis in T’s
assets as it imposes the tax, T can avoid the NJ imposition by selling all T’s assets before
changing residence. That choice would make little sense to T because T would become subject to
federal income tax as well – hardly a reasonable trade-off for avoiding a possible future New
Jersey income tax of some portion of T’s assets.
Many other examples will suggest themselves readily that result in the same income taxed under
the now differing state rules by two states without a resident tax credit available because the
They’re Going, FORBES (Sep. 5th, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2019/09/05/new-yorkers-areleaving-the-city-in-droves-heres-why-theyre-moving-and-where-theyre-going/.
43
Revenue estimates for the MtM Act are $23.3 billion in additional revenue for the State of NY for 2020, and
another $1.2 billion in each subsequent year.
44
NY State Const. Art. 16, § 3 provides in part: “[i]ntangible personal property shall not be taxed ad valorem nor
shall any excise tax be levied solely because of the ownership or possession thereof, except that the income
therefrom may be taken into consideration in computing any excise tax measured by income generally.” This section
also would seem to prohibit New York from taxing the amount included under I.R.C. § 965 because the section
further states: “[u]ndistributed profits shall not be taxed.”
Henry Ordower, Decoupling State Income Tax

Page 7

years of tax imposition differ. T in the examples could avoid the result in example 2 by not
changing residence.
The example 1 double tax is more difficult to avoid other than selling all non-NY real property in
the same year as the MtM Tax takes effect but that is no longer possible if NY adheres to its
2020 effective date to prevent billionaires from changing residence to avoid the tax. NJ might
consider taxing the gain on the NJ property when NY taxes it under the MtM Tax to force NY to
offer a tax credit for the NJ tax and cede the tax revenue to NJ. Such a tax in NJ violates
precedents under which states may not tax out-of-state taxpayers less favorably than resident
taxpayers.45 NJ might generalize the tax and apply it to NJ residents as well but that change
would be without substance since there would be no occasion on which the MtM Tax would be
imposed on a non-NY resident, but it may be imposed where there is a difference in determining
the taxpayer’s state of residence.
NY may alter the MtM Tax to provide a refund of the MtM Tax when the income is properly
taxed in another jurisdiction. The current proposal does not do so although it does provide a
credit for a similar tax imposed by another jurisdiction before imposition of the MtM Tax. NY
also might offer a generalized future credit against NY tax liability for such duplicative taxes
without limiting the credit to matching income source with creditable out-of-state tax, as most
resident credits currently do. But if the taxpayer does not own NY property and never resides in
NY again, such a credit would be of little value.
The reaction of other states to enactment of the MtM Tax would be to follow NY and impose a
like tax on their residents–certainly a difficult political challenge. The NY proposal, however, is
not compelling for other states. When it would become effective, NY residents who previously
were residents of another state get a credit against the NY tax for an MtM-like tax paid in
another state. As identified above, no state ever has imposed such a tax, so the credit means
nothing. The MtM Tax also permits new residents of NY–under the proposal meaning fewer than
five years–to increase the basis of their assets to fair market value on the date they become NY
residents, so they are taxable under the MtM Tax only on value increases accruing since they
became NY residents. The new residents would retain their historical bases for purposes of the
regular income tax lest they escape the NY income tax when they sell assets while NY residents.
The basis complexity is manifest insofar as imposition of the MtM Tax results in an increase in
NY basis both for regular income tax and MtM Tax inclusion purposes so as not to tax the same
income in NY twice.
The proposal is unclear on status changes. If a resident of another state who is not a billionaire
has substantially appreciated assets when they move to NY and does not become a billionaire
until they have been a NY resident for six years, the MtM Tax is imposed in the sixth year. The
MtM Tax proposal is unclear as to whether the taxpayer’s basis for purposes of the MtM Tax
became fair market value when the taxpayer became a NY resident regardless of billionaire class
status at that time. If that becomes the rule, anyone moving to NY who aspires to becoming a
billionaire would have to determine the value of all their assets when they become a NY resident
and maintain that record to protect against the MtM Tax. But for purposes of the NY resident
45

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 564 (1997) (property tax exemption
discriminating against out of state residents is impermissible).
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income tax on realized gain and collection of deferred compensation, the basis remains the
smaller historical basis.
To avoid many of these problems for their residents who might move to NY sometime in the
future, other states would enact a tax like the MtM Tax but at a lower threshold determined by
the relative likelihood that someone will become a billionaire more than five years after moving
to NY. NJ might set that level at a mere $500 million for example and Connecticut at $400
million of assets thereby setting off a race to the bottom by other states whose residents might
someday move to NJ or Connecticut. Ultimately, the outcome would become current taxation of
appreciation in value and the elimination of deferred compensation for state tax purposes, that is,
virtual complete decoupling from the federal income tax ideally under uniform rules.46 Perhaps
such decoupling will encourage Congress to eliminate many of the deferrals currently available
and to include in taxpayers’ incomes the annual change in value of all taxpayers’ assets under a
mark to market system. Such a system would eliminate the need for a new basis at death since
unrealized appreciation would be taxed annually under a Haig-Simons comprehensive tax base.47

46

Uniformity has been elusive on sales tax matters and revenue apportionment despite the efforts of the Multistate
Tax Commission.
47
HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 49
(1938).
Henry Ordower, Decoupling State Income Tax
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